A Private Equity Blog

A vignette into the aberrant thoughts of a private equiteer

Private equity ratchets in practice II

twowayI’ve harped on a little (or maybe a lot) about how iniquitous and unscrupulous equity ratchets are. I’ve said they misalign interests from the outset and lead to adversarial relationships when triggered. So, are there any equitable ways to structure equity ratchets? And, if not, why do we still use them?

Like most things, there are shades of grey. At one end, we have short-term one-way earnings-based ratchets that go against the mantra of private equity and pin executives to short-term performance. At the other end, we have long-term two-way returns-based ratchets that create much better alignment across the entire stock register.

So, let’s check out these characteristics:

  • One-way vs. Two-way - A two-way ratchet simply means that executives aren’t only punished for underperformance, but they’re rewarded for outperformance. A two-way ratchet supplants the need for executive option schemes and further encourages executives to invest their own cold hard cash. The only other consideration here is the rates at which the ratchet moves in each direction (more on this later).
  • Shorter-term vs. Longer-term - we can link our one-way ratchet to something that makes more sense for everyone… the exit. We lament public markets for their short-termism, so why do the same by using short-term ratchets? If we are going to align interests and have longer-term investment horizons, then we should use longer-term ratchets and give executives a chance to make a difference.
  • Earnings-based vs. Return-based - continuing with the concept of aligning interests, private equiteers are rewarded for returns, not earnings. Higher earnings certainly help boost returns, but there’s much more to a great return, like higher exit multiples and good leverage. If you want executives to maximise your exit return, then it makes sense to incentivise them on the return-side via a ratchet linked to IRR or cash multiple (thanks to a recent reader for this suggestion).

There’s one more consideration for two-way ratchets… the ratchet rate. Should the rate be equal for the downside and upside? Well, it depends. In all fairness it should, but sometimes the ratchet rate is adjusted to bridge valuation gaps. Managers may opt for a higher ratchet rate in exchange for a lower initial valuation, or vice versa. Also, the private equiteer must ensure the upside ratchet rate isn’t so aggressive as to eat into their target return (I’ve seen this happen).

So, it’s best to plot out a range of scenarios before agreeing to a ratchet to make sure that,  a) everyone is sufficiently incentivised, b) your target returns are possible in most scenarios, and c) misalignment and adversarial terms are minimised. Good luck.

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Posted in Structuring, Valuation

  • Thanks for the note Dirk. Sure, they're usually only one-way, like you suggest, but imagine it working both ways.

    So, say the normal ratchet is that the investor gets 5% extra equity if returns are below 20% IRR. This is designed to motivate management by punishing them on the downside. This is how a typical ratchet works.

    But, also image not only motivating them on the downside, but motivating them on the upside by reversing the ratchet to give them 5% extra equity if returns are above say 30% IRR.

    This is what I mean by a two-way ratchet. Think of it as a one-way ratchet, plus a stock option plan for management.
  • Dirk
    I don't really understand the term two way ratchet. There is just one ratchet, with (in general) the purpose of sharing incremental returns above a certain threshold in a different way from the common equity.
  • vlade
    Yep, I really liked your point b) (target the returns), as it makes it clear what you're trying to achieve - so from that point, you don't really have to divide alignement, in fact you can create interest in being ratcheded out (but still achieving or even over-achieving your results).
    In fact, in a perfect-day scenario it could make your exit strategy extremely easy too, as the other shareholder(s) would ratchet you to the point where it would be trivial to buy you out. That sounds bad - until the point where you take into account that in real money terms you'd at that time over-achieved your goals probably. Yes, you might have had more - but would have?

    Me like :). Thanks for the good job showing PE to outsiders like me.
  • Thanks for the kind words vlade... and for the comments on this post and elsewhere. Comments keep me honest and teach me a thing or two in the process.
  • vlade
    Thanks - I thought about two-way ratchets, but didn't have time to ask whether they are actually used..
  • It's similar to having a one-way ratchet and an executive option agreement. While the mechanics are a little different, you save on having to draft a completely separate option agreement as a two-way ratchet is generally just a few extra sentences in the stockholders' agreement.

    You could argue that a two-way ratchet divides interests because it creates different outcomes for different investors. But if it is structured properly, all investors benefit more as returns increase. So in effect, interests are still aligned adequately.

    We've put a two-way ratchet in a term sheet a few times, but never invested on one. I'm a fan if they're tied to returns (after exit), but not otherwise.
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